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INTRODUCTION
Anthony Archuleta relies on his opening brief and he refers
this Court to that brief for the statements of the issues, the
case, and the facts.

See Opening brief of Anthony Archuleta

(hereinafter "Opening brief"), pages 1-14.

Mr. Archuleta notes

one change: on April 29, 1996, the Utah Supreme Court "pouredover" this case to the Court of Appeals, which retains
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (k) .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State did not prove and the trial court's findings did
not establish the necessary factual circumstances for a
warrantless entry.

The findings failed to fully address the

circumstances then in existence just before, or during, the time
of the officers' entry into the home.

In addition, the jury

improperly considered evidence and "fruits" which should have
been suppressed.

The involved errors may neither be considered

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, nor is there any merit to the
contention that there was no likelihood of a different result.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
INADEQUATE CIRCUMSTANCES FAILED TO JUSTIFY OR SUPPORT
THE WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO THE RESIDENCE
(Reply to Points I & II of Appellee's brief)
Critical to either the consent or exigency determination are
the "totality" of the circumstances which were established
factually below.
1990); State v.

See State
Beavers,

v.

Arroyo,

796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah

859 P.2d 9, 19 (Utah App. 1993);

Appellee's brief, Points I.A. & II.A.

The State takes issue with

appellant's factual arguments and it contends that when the
factual circumstances are viewed "in the light most favorable to
the verdict and ruling[,]" Appellee's brief, page 6 n.l, such
circumstances support the court's legal conclusions.
Contrary to the State's urgings, a lower court's findings
are not necessarily entitled to the same deference on appeal as a
jury's verdict:
it is not accurate to say that the appellate court takes
that view of the evidence that is most favorable to the
appellee, that it assumes that all conflicts in the
evidence were resolved in his favor, and that he must be
given the benefit of all favorable inferences. All of
this is true in reviewing a jury verdict. It is not
true when it is the findings of the court that are being
reviewed. Instead, the appellate court may examine all
of the evidence in the record.
State v. Walker,

743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) (emphasis

added and citation omitted), quoted

in Opening brief, page 31

n. 5.
The State acknowledges appellant's argument "that the
trial court's findings are incomplete and inadequate because
2

they fail to resolve the issue of whether the police had
entered the home to detain Mr. [James] Archuleta . . . or
whether Mr. Archuleta had come out of the home in response to
the police's oral directive . . . "
30.

Appellee's brief, page

In response, the State claims, "the language of the

findings make clear that the court accepted the officers'
testimony over that of Mr. Archuleta; Officer Langley
'directed' Mr. Archuleta out of the house; Mr. Archuleta
'complied'; as he complied, he was 'watched.'"

Appellee's

brief, page 30 (emphasis added) (citing Findings of Fact,
paragraph 5)- 1
The concern here goes beyond crediting a single
officer's testimony over that of a defense witness.
Opening brief, page 31 n.5.2
1

Cf.

Since the officers themselves

Finding of Fact, paragraph 5 reads:

Not knowing whose house the suspects had entered, Deputy
Langley first summoned other deputies to be posted in a
perimeter around the house to prevent escape, then he

directed James Archuletta
out of the house to be searched
and interviewed.
As Mr. Archuletta
complied, he was watched
at gunpoint as he exited the house, was made to lay prone on
the front lawn, and upon being subjected
to a pat-down

search was found to not be in possession of any weapons. He
was then allowed to stand, whereupon the deputies holstered
their weapons or pointed them in non-threatening positions.
(R 235-3 6) (emphasis added).
2

The State also criticizes counsel for his
characterizations of the record. Appellee's brief, page 13.
However, in terms of advocacy and interpretation--both of which
emerge from the inadequate and questionable nature of the record,
the State may be reading more into the argument than what was
intended. For example, an accidental shooting was not the
desired portrayal. See Appellee's brief, page 13. Rather, self
defense is implicated when Bo Zahorka, a man who physically
3

differed in their stories, their own conflicting accounts
present the dilemma of how the trial court could have
"accepted" the officers testimony.

State

v.

Ramirez,

817

P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991) ("Because of these contradictions
in [police] testimony, it was critical for the trial judge to
make an explicit ruling on the seizure . . . and to enter
findings in the record resolving these factual disputes [as]
[t]he credibility questions are more complex than simply
resolving a conflict in testimony between defendant and the
officers"); of.

Appellee's brief, page 28 n.13 (wherein the

State attempted to temper the inconsistencies by arguing that
the record "reflects some conflicting but no contradictory
testimony").
According to deputy Langley, he obtained James' consent
before the detention.

(R 293); Opening brief, pages 25-26.

Sergeant Fred L. Smith, however, testified that the consent
occurred only after the detemtion.

(R 351) (consent was

obtained "only after he [James] was brought out of his own
home at gunpoint and laid face down onto the lawn while
officers still had their guns drawn"); Opening brief, page
24.

outmatches Anthony, pushes him, Appellee's brief, page 11, and
although Anthony had armed himself, he fired the gun only after
Bo had lunged or was upon him. Opening brief, pages 6-7. In
other instances, the State simply misreads his argument. See
Appellee's brief, page 9 n.4. Bo's death was connected to
Jeremy's death only because Anthony felt the need to have a gun
for his protection.
4

Moreover, the trial court's finding adds to the
confusion because it "accepts" deputy Langley's testimony
that "he directed James Archuleta out of the house to be
searched and interviewed[J"

(R 235) (Finding of Fact,

paragraph 5), even though Langley himself testified that his
initial discussions occurred before James came out of the
house.

Opening brief, page 12; (R 2 93) ("I

[Langley] spoke

to him [James], advised him that we were investigating a
crime that had occurred from across the street, that we had
reason to believe that people involved in the crime had run
into the house, that we needed to go into the house, and
asked his permission to go look and see if the people we
believed were there were inside").3
The word used, "directed", is itself less appropriate
for Langley's portrayal of an impassive request

and more

befitting of Sergeant Smith's authoritative order.

(R 342)

("We ordered them out of the residence at gunpoint").
In short, the trial court inconsistently credited deputy
Langley for having "directed" James out of the house, while
in the same clause the court discredited Langley's claim that
his calm and polite interview with James had preceded such
3

As suggested by the trial court's findings, the extensive
nature of the initial discussions also included James identifying
himself as the owner of the house and James reporting that his
son and a friend had recently entered the house and requested to
be driven away. (R 293-94); (R 236) (Finding of Fact, paragraph
7 ) ; cf.
(R 236) (Finding of Fact, paragraph 8) (consent was
obtained or agreed upon only after James had been informed that
the deputies were searching for the persons involved in a
shooting).
5

direction.
note 3.

(R 235) (Finding of Fact, paragraph 5 ) ; see

supra

The circumstances necessary to justify the

warrantless entry were not established, at least as claimed
by the officers, and the court failed to precisely set forth
what had occurred.
Consent and exigencies could not have both existed in
the case at bar,4 but they did because the trial court
improperly pieced together incompatible sections of
See Ramirez,

conflicting officers' testimony.

817 P.2d at

788 (reversal required as "only the most selective picking
and choosing from among the officer's testimony could support
such a conclusion").

The subsidiary factual findings

provided an inadequate basis for the trial court's legal
conclusions.
To avoid repetition, Anthony Archuleta also continues to
maintain his arguments previously briefed.
brief, Points A & B.

See

Opening

The motion to suppress should have been

granted.

4

No exigency existed Lf the officers had the time to first
pause longer enough to politely question James Archuleta about
who /he was, where the suspects were, and what had been said, see
supra note 1 and text accompanying note, as well as to realize
that no legitimate safety concerns then existed. Opening brief,
pages 19-20. Consent also was not validly obtained if officers
had hurriedly and forcibly opened the front door, pulled the
phone out of James' hand, and yanked him outside. Opening brief,
pages 24, 32-36.
6

POINT II
REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE OF THE JURY'S IMPROPER
CONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN
SUPPRESSED
(Reply to Point III of Appellee's brief)
The State lastly argues that "any alleged erroneous
admission of the physical evidence seized would be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt."

Appellee's brief, page 40.

It

speculates that "[t]he jury did not base its verdict on the
admission of the murder weapon and ammunition, but on the
eyewitness accounts of the shooting."

Appellee's brief, page 45.

Such a claim is doubtful, however, given the manner in which the
State presented its case and the number of witnesses who
admittedly did not actually see the shooting.5
More important, while the State correctly argues that
"physical evidence" was involved, Anthony Archuleta moved for "an
order suppressing all
added).

evidence

seized. . ."

(R 28) (emphasis

" [T]he word 'evidence' is a comprehensive term,

embracing not only testimony, or the statements of witnesses, but
also . . . whatever may be submitted to a court or a jury to
5

According to the State, "many bystanders were aware of
the escalating confrontation. Some wanted to leave (R. 777); one
wanted to call the police (R. 884); another ducked behind his car
and pretended to check his tires (R. 827, 828-29). But the ones
that watched saw defendant shoot Bo Zahorka (R. 812-13, 823-24;
829)." Appellee's brief, page 11. Bystanders are different than
eyewitnesses, though, particularly when the bystanders were not
in a position to actually see the shooting. See (R 829) (Robert
Beeler did not see the shooting, but "when I heard a loud noise
[gun fire], then I looked up over the hood of my car [since he
was checking his tires]"); (R'823-24) (Raymond Rudd said only, "I
seen the littlest of the two fellows, it looked like he hit the
big guy in the chest[,]" and Raymond said nothing about a gun).
7

elucidate an issue or prove a case."
315, 321 n.4 (Utah 1980) ; cf.

id.

Hansen

v.

Owens,

619 P. 2d

(quoting from a rule then in

effect, the opinion also noted, "'Evidence,' as used in these
rules, includes the means, oral, documentary or physical, used as
proof on issues of fact").
When Mr. Archuleta had sought to exclude only physical
evidence, for other matters he had said so.

See (R 13 6) (in his

"Motion in Limine", he expressly listed the "items of physical
evidence" at issue).

By comparison, no such physical limitations

were listed in his "Motion to Suppress Illegally Seized
Evidence".

(R 28).

In the case at bar, the State does not argue harmless error
for the improper admission of evidence other than the gun and
ammunition (nor for the cumulative effect of all of the involved
evidence).

Indeed, the prosecution below emphasized virtually

everything about the case which had occurred after

the shooting.

See (R 582-768) (the prosecution's case-in-chief repeatedly
addressed what police officers or state employees had heard,
observed, or otherwise considered as a result of the evidence
obtained from the warrantless entry into the home).
The after-the-shooting evidence may have provided some
foundational aspects of the State's case, see, e.g., (R 689)
(medical examiner's testimony), but if the fact finding mission
was truly directed towards the actions and mental state then in
existence at the precise moment of the shooting, the after-thefact evidence amounted to little more than an impassioned
8

distraction for the jury.6
The State's case hinged on more than eyewitness testimony
and the evidence as a whole was not overwhelming.

The jurors

themselves did not believe everything was clear cut - - a fact
evidenced by their note to the court which suggested that they
were struggling with whether Anthony had acted "unlawfully".

(R

228) (juror note asking court to "define unlawfully as used in
the instruction. . . " ) .

At the very least, the testimonial

evidence of the officers participating in the illegal entry (as
well as other state employees involved thereafter) may not be
considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

All of the

6

See, e.g., State
v. Bolsinger,
699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985)
(after the fact conduct, even actions deemed "reprehensible",
were not relevant to the defendant's state of mind at the time of
the incident); State
v. Talbot,
792 P.2d 489, 495 n.13 (Utah App.
1991) (another after the fact consideration, flight, is an
inadequate basis for creating an articulable suspicion for a
stop).
In any event, the gun and ammunition still played an
important role in the jury's deliberation. Immediately before
the shooting, Bo responded to the gun by saying, "What are you
going [to] do, you little punk?"
(R 964). The State claims Bo's
statement was made with a laugh. Appellee's brief, page 11; but
see Appellee's brief, page 46 (citing [R 882-84; 964; 1030]
Anthony was frightened by, and fearful of, Bo Zahorka). Unlike
Bo's claimed reaction to the gun, the jury may have responded
differently if the gun had been suppressed. For instance, the
jurors reaction to actually seeing the size of the gun (as
opposed to being told about it or looking at an enlarged picture)
may have been one of fear or amusement. The jury then may have
credited the "little punk" statement as being a threatening dare
or a joke, either one of which was the basis for Anthony's
response and his mental state. Viewing the gun in evidence and
visually placing it in Anthony's hand at trial also gave the jury
an opportunity to perceive how Anthony had handled the gun and
the manner in which it may have been flashed, used, or withdrawn.
9

illegally seized evidence submitted to the jury "to elucidate an
issue or prove a case" should have been suppressed.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Archuleta respectfully requests this Court to reverse
the conviction and remand his case for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this _/

day of May, 1996.

RONALD S. FUJJINO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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